Modified: 2022-02-23
Mjøset maintains that much of social science has aped the ideal notion of theory, or what he calls the deductive-nomological ideal. That notion of theory is precisely the description given by Hawking (1988) in his book, A Brief History of Time (and one of your readings). In this ideal conception of scientific theory, scientists (especially physicists) look for generalizations about nature. As Hawking notes, "I shall take the simpleminded view that a theory is just a model of the universe, or a restricted part of it, and a set of rules that relate quantities in the model to observations that we make." (p. 9, emphasis added). Hawking goes on to discuss Newton's theory of gravity and says that Newton was able to deduce much about the universe on the basis of two variables, mass and distance. Simply stated, the larger the mass the larger the value of gravity, and the greater the distance squared the weaker the value of gravity. Those statements of Newton's comprise the law of gravity.
Many social scientists have tried to use the ideal notion of theory in their work. But, as Mjøset points out, there are few, if any, examples of strong social science laws (He cites Durkheim's statement of the relationship between social cohesion and rates of suicide). One way to achieve the ideal notion of theory in social science is to reduce social science findings to more basic sciences. Mjøset and others doubt that such a reduction "...can be achieved in practice." (p. 15642). Instead of reductionism, Mjøset points to four modification to the ideal notion of theory. Two of them (law oriented and idealizing) are compromises, and two (constructivist and critical) reject ideal theory and recast science in new and different ways.
Law oriented
In the law oriented view of theory, the search for physical and logical laws is retained (nomology), but the universality of social science "laws" are diminished. Social scientists, in effect, restrict their efforts to contexts likely to yield useful small-scale theories. Robert K. Merton, a sociologist, probably provided the clearest conception of law oriented theories with his concept of middle range theories. In middle range theorizing, social scientists retain their methodological rigor, but only within a clearly delimited area of interest. Theories of cognition are of this type, those theorists realize that their findings do not generalize to say, emotion or to social behavior. In fact, the usual organization of a general psychology text is testimony to law oriented theory with those texts' chapters representing fairly independent areas of local interest. Merton, as Mjøset notes, saw middle range theories as temporary because of the relative immaturity of social science vis as vis the physical sciences. As social science matured, its theories would become more and more like ideal theories.
Idealizing
In idealizing theory, theorists abandon the effort to explain everything and attempt to explain an ideal extreme instead. That extreme then becomes an ideal model, one that only describes one particular set of circumstances. That is where the term idealizing comes from. Interestingly, economics has embraced this theoretical model with dramatic results. The main problem with idealizing models is that their predictions are to the ideal world they posit, not to the real world, which is the ultimate focus of social science interest. So then, how to move from the ideal to the real? The usual mechanism, Mjøset states, is to relax some of the idealizing assumptions of the theory. Doing so, however, makes the models much more complex than they were in their original extreme state. That added complexity makes the model more difficult to use. A useful example here is the familiar operant chamber. In it, the animal is placed into a kind of ideal situation. Only the manipulandum exists, and eventually the animal learns to use it properly. Move that animal to another more complex and more real situation, and the model becomes much more complicated or it simply no longer works.
Constructivist
The constructivists are the heirs of skepticism, pragmatism, and phenomenology, and they question the very foundations of social science. They reject ideal theory's separation of everyday knowledge and scientific knowledge. Instead, scientific knowledge here is part of all knowledge and is difficult to separate. So, science here is not a subject, rather it is more an activity or a set of cultural rules. Scientists are people who have been acculturated into a system which values intellectual rigor, replication of research results, consistency, and other characteristics that define science. Mjøset sees cognitive science as an example of the constructivist approach because of its interdisciplinary nature and because of its focus on studying knowledge, communication, and information themselves as opposed to studying a method that reveals data on those subjects. Constructivists maintain that what we perceive as real is a social agreement about the nature of reality. Studying how scientists work is nearly indistinguishable from anthropologists studying other cultures. Both the other cultures and science each have their mores, myths, and visions. Constructivist theories are analogical (as are idealizing theories), but the range of analogies permissible is wider. Mjøset illustrates this by Darwin's use of Malthus' population theory in his formulation of natural selection. History and the humanities also play a larger role in constructivist theorizing. The role of human interaction, physical, symbolic, and linguistic also plays a larger role here. Constructivist theories are not designed to predict but to explain and to influence reality. Finally, constructivism does not aim for one all-encompassing theory, but is content and comfortable with creating and maintaining many theories simultaneously.
Critical
Critical theory opposes what is sees as constructivism's relativity and attempts to cure that relativity by providing a universal ethical foundation. Unabashedly, critical theory views the Enlightenment as still incomplete and seeks to finish the job. Ideal theory is rejected here too because of the perception that scientists have come to be part of the problem. Mjøset cites the creation of nuclear weapons and the proliferation of technology as examples (Think of the Unabomber). To solve the deficiencies of ideal theory and of constructivist theory, language and communicative ethics are invoked. Critical theorists realize, however, that movements to gain human rights are still ongoing and are indicative of human progress. They invoke examples of the labor movement and feminism. Both those movements led to the establishment of new and morally correct ways of looking at work and at women. Social sciences are seen as action sciences in contrast to empirical analytical sciences or historical-hermaneutic sciences. The role of the action sciences is nothing less than liberation, whereas the role of empirical-analytical sciences and historical-hermaneutic sciences are technical dominance and intersubjective understanding, respectively. Social scientists who adopted ideal theory became ideologists, not scientists, in critical theory's view. Critical theory's theoretical formulations, too, are complex and are not applied. The main distinguishing feature of critical theory is its focus on universal ethical principles. In addition, the "culture wars" of the last twenty years are seen as evidence of the unfolding of new rights and as leading to a new understanding of social science.
Now What?
How has reading this article changed your ideas about theory and science?
Can you tell me what kind of social scientist you may be?
How does your individual research project fit into these models of social science?